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INTRODUCTION 
One of the earliest studies based on Robert Mare’s (1981) concept of and 
statistical approach to educational choices and transitions was an analysis 
based on 1973 data from the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (Simkus 
and Andorka 1982). Since then, a great variety of sociological and economic 
studies have investigated educational inequalities, school choice, and school 
transitions in Hungary. Hungary is not just interesting in itself because it has 
one of the most unequal education systems in the OECD with an 
extraordinarily high impact of family background on test scores (OECD 
2010a). It is also unique due to its educational institutional setup that hinders 
intergenerational mobility and increases intra-generational inequalities. There 
are evidently several potential sources of educational inequalities (see 
introductory chapter of the volume). Hungary combines quite a large number 
of these and probably has an ‘influential’ system of institutions for increasing 
inequalities. This makes it essential to understand their role. As we argue 
below, it is a combination of competition between schools on the primary 
level, heavy tracking on the lower and upper secondary level, and within-
school differentiation that has led to the current, rather unequal system. 
The goal of this chapter is to answer the three main research questions 
highlighted in the first chapter of this volume. 
1.  How are students allocated to different types of lower and upper 
secondary education (educational differentiation)? 
2.  Is the first students’ allocation permanent? How far do students get a 
second chance to shift between types of secondary education and why?  
3.  What are the short- and long-term effects of attending different types of 
secondary education? 
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DESCRIPTION OF THE SYSTEM 
Although earlier changes in the Hungarian school system have already been 
described and summarized (Bukodi and Róbert 2008), there have been many 
recent changes that could influence the allocation of students between and 
within schools. Historically, Hungary can be considered as one of the 
variations of the so-called German school model similar to most Central-
Eastern European countries. During the Communist era, pupils spent eight 
years in the non-tracked primary and lower secondary school (általános 
iskola) and three to four years in the tracked upper secondary school 
(középfokú iskola). Before the upper secondary level at the age of 14, they 
had to make an important choice on whether to enter an academically 
oriented secondary track (gimnázium), a more vocationally oriented 
secondary track (szakközépiskola), or an apprenticeship/vocational training 
track (szakmunkásképzés or later szakiskola). Whereas the former two 
allowed students to continue to the tertiary level, the latter was an academic 
dead-end leading only to the possibility of entering the labour market. As in 
most systems of the Soviet type, the curriculum was highly standardized and 
there was no variation in textbooks or teaching materials. For the 
academically and vocationally oriented secondary level tracks, there was a 
final exam (érettségi) at the end of secondary education that was also 
standardized. Significant changes occurred in the school system during the 
post-Communist transition. However, the last two and a half decades can be 
divided into the two following periods. 
The Pre-2011 Period  
In line with the general democratization and marketization processes of the 
post-Communist transition, the school system in Hungary became one of the 
most decentralized in Europe with highly increased school-level autonomy 
(OECD 2004, D6 indicators). The centralized and standardized curriculum 
was replaced by a large variety of school programmes. Schools had freedom 
of choice in terms of educational programmes and methods and could draw 
on a large variety of textbooks because of the emerging market for different 
teaching materials. As in other fields, a school market and consequently 
competition between schools became a main feature of the Hungarian 
educational system on both the primary and secondary level. Increasing 
competition had a ‘quantitative’ as well as a ‘qualitative’ aspect. In 
quantitative terms, the number of students decreased rapidly due to a 
demographic decline in the size of the post-transition school-entry cohorts 
that created free capacities within schools. The other ‘qualitative’ aspect was 
that schools, utilizing their widespread autonomy, competed for the ‘better’ 
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students in order to achieve a better class composition in their school. The 
best and most innovative schools used their freedom and autonomy to 
develop new school tracks, programmes, and curricula that would appeal to 
better students. 
Another source of school differentiation was the change in the education 
provider. During the Communist era, almost all schools were public.1 From 
the 1990s onwards, the non-public sector started to emerge. The number of 
church-funded religious schools started to increase drastically, and several 
privately funded schools were also established. After roughly two decades, 
by 2012, about 20 per cent of primary schools were non-public and about 
three-quarters of these were of a denominational character. In terms of 
enrolment, about 14 per cent of pupils were studying full-time in non-public 
schools. The majority of these pupils were enrolled in religious schools and 
less than 1.5 per cent in private schools. When looking at the academic 
secondary schools, 40 per cent of these schools were non-public and more 
than half of them were of a denominational character in 2012. In full-time 
education, about 26 per cent of students studied in non-public institutions and 
about four-fifths of these studied in religious schools (Ministry of Human 
Resources 2013).The public–private divide can also be seen as a kind of 
tracking in the Hungarian school system, as shown by Dronkers and Róbert 
(2004). 
The Post-2011 Period 
Since 2011 with the passing of the CXC/2011. Law on Public Education,2 the 
democratization and marketization process (with its pros and cons) has been 
halted and reversed. Whereas previously, local governments ran their own 
schools, it is now the national school provider that hires and fires teachers, 
allocates resources, and decides on the newly centralized curriculum. Choices 
in the available textbooks have also plummeted. The previous per-student 
lump-sum financing has been replaced by a per-teacher lump-sum financing 
with a fixed teacher–student ratio. The regulations for opening a new 
religious school or taking over a public school have been eased. 
Consequences of the new system cannot be studied yet due to the lack of 
data, but we can expect some decline in competition between schools on the 
primary level (due to the centralization process), but an increase in religious 
tracking on the lower- and upper-secondary level. Basic rules of early-
tracking on the lower secondary level are still the same. 
Nevertheless, due to the lack of available data, all our analysis below 
concerns the pre-2011 status of the Hungarian education system. 
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MAIN MECHANISMS FOR DIFFERENTIATION 
Although in theoretical terms, the Hungarian school system can be 
characterized by four forms of differentiation (see Table 8.1), we shall 
examine only three of these possible forms empirically because of data 
limitations. The empirical section below considers the two external 
differentiation mechanisms (both the formal and the informal) and the 
internal-formal differentiation (within school specializations). It will not 
consider the internal-informal differentiations because hardly any empirical 
evidence is available on these.3 
There are three major sources of external and formal differentiation: 
tracking on lower secondary level, tracking on upper secondary level, and the 
selection of students between public and non-public schools. Whereas these 
mechanisms are regulated forms of differentiation that are recognized by law 
and can also be seen in school certificates/qualifications, the competition 
between otherwise similar schools on the primary level can be considered as 
an informal mechanism of differentiation. The operation of both of these 
external differentiation mechanisms is well described and well researched 
empirically (e.g. Kertesi and Kézdi 2010a, 2013; Horn 2013). 
One type of external-formal differentiation is vocational tracking on the 
upper secondary level at age 14. This was also possible during the 
Communist era. Some have argued that the school system was the main 
transmitter of social inequalities during that period. Whereas other channels 
of reproduction were under political control, cultural and educational 
reproduction of intergenerational inequalities was still possible (Ganzeboom 
et al. 1990) . For school transitions under Communism, the odds of entry into 
the various types of upper secondary school, and the choice between the  
 
Table 8.1: Main mechanisms of differentiation in Hungary 
 External (between schools) Internal (within schools) 
Formal Vocational tracking a 
(apprenticeship/vocational training 
and vocational secondary at age 14)
Early tracking (ages 10 and 12)a 
Non-public schools a 
Specializations a 
One special school year dedicated to 
learning languages 
Subjects on advanced levels 
Informal Competition between schools 
(primary level)a 
Teachers’ characteristics in different 
classes 
Ability grouping (class 
composition) 
Notes:  a Mechanism for which empirical evidence is available. 
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academic secondary school, vocational secondary school, or apprenticeship 
school were influenced most strongly by parental background. The transition 
from secondary to tertiary level was also influenced strongly by this school 
choice at age 14. As a result, the direct effect of social origin was smaller at 
the tertiary level transition point (Róbert 1991).  
More recent studies have looked at the outcome differences between these 
tracks and argued that whereas there is a clear and strong selection of students 
between these tracks based on their ability and their social background, there 
is no observable performance difference between the academic secondary 
track and the vocational secondary track once this selection is accounted for 
(Horn et al. 2006). However, it is also argued that apprenticeship/vocational 
training tracks provide a smaller value-added in math or reading compared to 
the other two tracks (Hermann 2013). Thus tracking on upper secondary level 
intensifies differences between social classes. 
Early tracking on the lower secondary level has similar consequences 
(Horn 2013). A prominent solution on the lower secondary level for the 
problems created by the demographic decline was to establish a six-year-long 
or even an eight-year-long academically oriented educational track. With such 
an institutional transformation, the better and more innovative schools tried to 
cream off the best students and thus avoid firing staff or closing down. This 
change – as was argued at the time – could also be more efficient from a 
pedagogical perspective, because pupils could achieve better in such tracks 
(see Liskó 1994; Horn 2010). Thus, basically the original four-year academic 
track was extended by the new six-year-long and eight-year-long academic 
tracks. In fact, these new school tracks shortened the years pupils spent in 
primary school from eight years to six or four years. Pupils (and families) had 
to choose which educational track to follow and what school to attend two or 
four years earlier. This resulted in early tracking at the ages of 10 or 12, but 
only for the top of the ability distribution. Note, however, that the previous 
‘Soviet-type’ tracking at the age of 14 was and still is present for pupils at the 
bottom of the distribution (cf. apprenticeship/vocational training tracks). 
The third form of external-formal tracking is tracking between public and 
non-public schools. A previous analysis of church-run schools in Hungary 
has shown that students in these schools perform better and have higher 
success rates for transition to higher education than students in public 
schools. This advantage persists after controlling for the dissimilar student 
composition in church-run schools (Dronkers and Róbert 2004). 
External and informal differentiation is about school choice in Hungary. It 
is possible to choose schools both on the primary and on the secondary level. 
On the primary level, a district principle is in effect, meaning that schools 
have to take those students who live within their assigned catchment area. 
However, it is possible to apply to any other school, and the school principal 
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has the right to decide whom to admit.4 On the secondary level, school choice 
and tracking – as described above – cannot be separated empirically. It has 
been argued that the inequality-increasing mechanism of school choice on the 
primary level is very important and follows a rather straightforward logic: at 
the early stages of the post-Communist transition, when the demographic 
decline hit hardest leading to the possibility of school choice, larger 
settlements tried to attract pupils from nearby villages to fill their empty 
places and avoid firing teachers. Naturally, only the more affluent parents 
(usually those with a motor car who were already working in the city) could 
afford to commute daily between the village and the city, and schools also 
more probably selected these students for obvious reasons. This created 
socially segregated schools first in the smaller villages, then within the multi-
school cities as well (see Kertesi and Kézdi 2009 for a detailed description of 
the mechanism, and 2013 for the empirical proof). Kertesi and Kézdi (2013, 
27, Figure 2) show that segregation has increased tremendously within the 
last 15 years, and argue that this marked increase is due mainly to the 
increased possibility of school choice. 
Internal and formal forms of differentiation can be the various possible 
specializations schools offer their students. These are either extra-curricular 
courses, held frequently in the afternoon hours after regular lessons on 
various subjects such as informatics or sports, or deliberately selected classes 
within a school cohort offering a higher number of lessons in a given subject 
during the teaching day, usually in math, Hungarian, or music. An important 
form of such within-school differentiation is the availability of specialized 
classes in foreign language training. Language training can also be provided 
in either (1) the so-called language-preparatory classes that offer an 
additional year of intensive language training between Grades 8 and 9 or (2) 
the so-called bilingual trainings in which this additional year is followed by 
teaching some subjects (e.g. math) in the given foreign language. Taking part 
in these within-school specializations is not cheap. Students receiving such 
extra-curricular or increased number of courses are likely to perform better. 
Thus there is a good chance that this internal and formal differentiation 
within schools contributes to the accumulation of educational opportunities. 
Unfortunately, no direct nationwide official statistics are available on this. 
However, just under 2.5 per cent of students in 8th grade were attending 
bilingual classes in 2012, whereas an additional 14 per cent were in classes 
with a specialization. These ratios go up to 5 per cent and 23 per cent 
respectively in 10th grade. Within-school specializations are a bit more 
prevalent in public schools than in the church-run schools, and much more 
prevalent than in private schools. 
Internal and informal differentiation involves teachers’ characteristics in 
different schools or classes as well as ability grouping. If observations made 
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by Varga (2011) are correct, there is a self-selection of teachers into schools 
with higher student status or ability. Consequently, they play an important 
role in ‘maintaining’ inequalities in educational opportunities for students 
coming from various social backgrounds. Ability grouping, the other form of 
internal and informal differentiation, is practiced for certain subjects such as 
languages or math. Further types of grouping (e.g. based on ethnicity) are 
regarded as discrimination and are illegal. Official national statistics on 
ability grouping are hard to find. The PISA 2006 survey shows that about 
two-thirds of school principals reported using ability grouping in their school 
for at least one subject. However it is not clear what share of this figure refers 
to the formal specializations (described above) and how much to the informal 
differentiation of students. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
Datasets 
We utilize two interconnected datasets. The National Assessment of Basic 
Competencies (NABC) (see OECD 2010b) and the Hungarian Life Course 
Survey (HLCS) (see Kertesi and Kézdi 2010b). The NABC is a standard-
based annual assessment designed similarly to the OECD PISA, but in which 
individuals can be followed up over the years. The NABC tests reading and 
mathematical literacy in 6th, 8th, and 10th grade. Although scores are 
standardized not only within but also across cohorts to a mean of 1500 and a 
standard deviation of 200, we report within-cohort standardized betas (0 
mean and 1 standard deviation) so that the point estimates of test score and 
socio-economic status (see below) can be compared. Whereas reading and 
mathematics tests are conducted within school, students are also expected to 
take home a family background questionnaire to be completed by their 
parents. Although this makes the response rate somewhat lower than that in 
the OECD PISA survey, the available data are considered to be more reliable. 
The official datasets also contain a socio-economic status index (SES) that 
is a z-standardized product of several variables describing the social, 
economic, and cultural background of the student.5 
For the analysis below we pool three cohorts from 2008, 2009, and 2010. 
We run separate regressions for the 6th- and 8th-grade cohorts. All these 
cohorts were also surveyed two years later in 2010, 2011, and 2012 in 8th 
and 10th grade respectively. To interpret changes at the secondary level 
(especially between 8th and 10th grade), we have to consider that all earlier 
educational decisions contribute to this late educational choice. Because the 
parents of higher status students want to secure their advantage at an earlier 
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stage (which is incorporated in pupils’ human capital), we probably 
underestimate the impact of SES. 
The HLCS dataset contains a representative subsample of the 8th-grade 
2006 cohort from the NABC dataset. A total of 10 022 students were sampled 
and followed through their education career in six waves. These six waves 
contain detailed information on the respondents’ ethnicity, schools, family 
background (including poverty and home environment), as well as many 
other dimensions. We shall utilize this dataset to show the selectivity of the 
system between the lower and upper secondary level (between 8th and 9th 
grade), in the transitions between tracks within the secondary level, and in the 
transition from school to work or post-secondary education.6 
Allocation of Students (Research Question 1) 
As described above there are three potential external and formal 
differentiation mechanisms. Table 8.2 highlights the ‘vocational tracking’ 
mechanism between 8th and 9th grade. The table shows that students who are 
already in the six- or eight-year-long academic tracks in 8th grade are much 
more likely to enter academic tracks one year later. These students have a 
much higher SES and also much higher test scores: the z-standardized SES 
and test score points of students in the early-selective tracks are more than 
one standard deviation higher than those of the average student. 
Moreover, higher SES and higher test score students from the general 
track are more likely to enter the academic secondary tracks, whereas the 
lower SES and lower test score students are more likely to enter the 
apprenticeship/vocational training tracks. The difference between these tracks 
is more than one standard deviation in both SES and test scores. Students’ 
SES and scores on vocational secondary tracks are very similar to those of 
the average student in the full population. 
Table 8.2 also shows the percentage of students entering each track who 
had practiced school choice in the 1st grade of primary school (choice 
columns). The table shows that around 18 per cent of the cohort attended 
primary schools outside their catchment area. However, 36 per cent of 
students entering early selective tracks utilized this possibility of school 
choice. Naturally, we are unable to show the direction of causality. It is 
unclear whether school choice contributes to an earlier selection of these 
students – for example through better school–student matches that help 
children to develop faster – or whether the practice of school choice and the 
mechanism of early selection targets the same population, namely the higher 
status and more highly skilled students. 
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Table 8.2:  Distribution of students and their basic characteristics across school types in 8th and 9th grade 
  8th-grade track type  
  General track Early-selective academic track (6 or 8 year) 
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  % N SES Test score Choice a % N SES Test score Choice 
Other 2.21 221 –0.84 –0.64 0.15 0.05 5 0.95 1.05 0.20 
Lower secondary 0.66 66 –0.68 –0.92 0.18 0.01 1 –0.30 1.33 0.00 
Apprenticeship 27.84 2 790 –0.67 –0.76 0.12 0.13 13 –0.26 –0.46 0.23 
Vocational secondary 40.35 4 044 0.00 –0.01 0.16 0.26 26 0.58 0.30 0.23 
Academic secondary 21.84 2 189 0.62 0.71 0.25 0.21 21 1.12 1.15 0.29 
Early selective academic 
secondary (6- or 8-year) 
2.25 225 1.01 1.02 0.38 4.20 421 1.06 1.28 0.38 
 Total 95.14 9535 –0.05 –0.06 0.17 4.86 487 1.00 1.17 0.36 
Source: Own calculations based on the HLCS. 
Notes:  a Percentage of students entering each track who practiced school choice in 1st-grade primary school. 
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Tables 8.3 and 8.4 show a different approach to the same question. Using 
the panel structure of the NABC dataset, we estimate the effect of family 
background and test scores on the transition into early-selective tracks on the 
lower secondary level (Table 8.3), the transition into vocational or academic 
tracks and non-public schools on the upper secondary level (Table 8.4), the 
practice of school choice on the lower secondary level (Table 8.3), and 
entering classes with some specialization (math, languages, arts, etc.) on the 
lower (Table 8.3) or upper secondary (Table 8.4) level. All estimations below 
include previous school fixed effects besides the individual level SES, test 
score, and gender controls. Although we admit that by using these fixed 
effects, we might over-control for unmeasured heterogeneity in the 6th-grade 
panel,7 we argue that these results are more conservative, and thus show a 
lower bound to the extent of inequality-increasing mechanisms in the 
Hungarian system. 
The first and foremost conclusion from these analyses is that family 
background matters even after controlling for previous test scores. In almost 
all of these estimations, the effect of SES is comparable in size to, if not 
larger than, the effect of test score. For instance, a student who has a one 
standard deviation higher family background compared to another student 
with similar test scores from the same school has a 21.6 per cent higher 
chance of entering a six-year academic track, an 11.4 per cent higher chance 
of entering a church school, or a 5.8 per cent higher chance of entering a 
private school. One standard deviation higher SES predicts a 23.4 per cent 
lower chance of entering the apprenticeship/vocational training and a 15.7 per 
cent higher chance of entering the academic secondary track as opposed to 
the vocational secondary track. Whereas at first glance, it might seem 
surprising that lower SES families are more likely to enter private tracks on 
the upper secondary level, we note that anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
distribution of private schools is two-peaked: these schools compete both for 
the rich and provide elite training, whereas numerous foundation schools also 
try to fill a void left by the public education system and educate students who 
would otherwise drop out of the system. 
The NABC also allows a rough estimation of the extent of within-school 
differentiation. Students in the questionnaire are asked about their 
specializations. The specialization columns show that family status matters in 
the internal differentiation as well. One standard deviation higher SES is 
associated with a 7 per cent increase on the lower and a 13 per cent increase 
on the upper secondary level in the chances of students being in a class with 
specialization. This is comparable in size with the effects of the external-
formal non-public tracking mechanism. 
  
Table 8.3: Association of possible indicators of tracking with outcomes in 8th grade, fixed effect logit, and average marginal 
effects (standard errors in parentheses) 
External and formal External-informal Internal-formal 
Early selection a Church b Private c Choice d Specialization e 
SES 0.216** 0.114** 0.058** 0.046** 0.071** 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.011) (0.002) (0.003) 
Test score, 6th grade 0.262** 0.032** –0.080** 0.032** 0.097** 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) 
Female 0.035** –0.009 –0.024 0.003 0.020** 
(0.005) (0.008) (0.016) (0.003) (0.004) 
Cohort (ref. 2008)      
2009 0.008 0.012 0.020 0.003 –0.003 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.020) (0.003) (0.005) 
2010 0.019** 0.202** –0.018 0.008* 0.019** 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.021) (0.004) (0.005) 
Previous school fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 181 466 140 170 42 869 203 773 155 042 
6th grade school fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes 
Log Likelihood –32 293 –16 119 –3 674 –92 831 –50 587 
χ2 test 15 544** 1 347** 78.77** 1 484** 3 886** 
Pseudo R2 0.194 0.040 0.011 0.008 0.037 
Source:  Own calculations based on the NABC 2012–2010, 2011–2009, and 2010–2008 panels.  
Notes: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 
 Reference person: SES = 0, Test score = 0, Cohort: 2008 = 1, Female = 0; a whether student is in a 6- or 8-year long academic track in 8th grade; b whether 
student is in a church-run school in 8th grade; c whether student is in a privately run school in 8th grade; d whether student attends a school outside her or 
his residential catchment area in 8th grade; e whether student attends a class with specialization in one subject (math, languages, arts) in 8th grade.  
  
Table 8.4:  Association of possible indicators of tracking with outcomes in 10th grade, fixed effect logit, and average marginal 
effects 
 External and formal Internal and formal 
 Vocational tracking Non-public tracking  
 Voc./apprenticeship 
track a 
Academic 
track b 
Church c Private d  Specialization e 
SES –0.234** 0.157** 0.107** –0.006* 0.137** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Test score, 8th grade –0.409** 0.208** 0.027*** –0.084** 0.225** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Female 0.069** –0.062** –0.024** –0.003 –0.034** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
Cohort (ref. 2008)      
2009 0.006 0.004 –0.000 –0.005 0.045** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) 
2010 0.047** –0.036** 0.053** –0.002 –0.018** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) 
Observations 205 786 186 072 172 867 153 830 210 420 
8th grade school fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes 
Log Likelihood –53 615 –88 615 –35 904 –34 075 –93 295 
χ2 test 56 074** 26 486** 1 927** 943.4** 32 914** 
Pseudo R2 0.343 0.130 0.026 0.014 0.150 
Source:  Own calculations based on the NABC 2012–2010, 2011–2009, and 2010–2008 panels. 
Notes:  See Table 8.3.  
  
Table 8.5:  Percentage of students for whom these events have happened at least once through their secondary level education 
career (conditional probabilities) 
   Non-educated parents 
 Events Total population Roma Non-Roma Roma Non-Roma 
(1) Grade repetitiona 18 30 17 31 23 
(2) Grade repetition within school tracka 15 25 14 26 19 
(3) Secondaryb → Apprenticeship 13 30 12 34 30 
(4) Apprenticeship → Secondaryb 25 13 28 11 19 
(5) Academic → Vocational secondary 11 17 10 12 19 
(6) Vocational Sec. → Academic 8 6 9 4 6 
(7) Full time ed. → Dropout 5 28 4 34 15 
(8) Full time ed. → Night school 2 6 1 6 2 
(9) Night school → Dropout 45 78 30 84 68 
(10) Dropout → Dropout 82 89 76 90 88 
(11) Dropout → Full time ed. 14 8 19 9 12 
(12) Dropout → Night school 4 2 5 2 2 
(13) Night school → Full time ed. 37 15 47 10 12 
Source: Kertesi-Kézdi 2010a, Table 7, HLCS 2006-2009, four waves. 
Notes:  Night school = night schooling, distant schooling, or individually designed curricula. a Multiple year repetitions are counted as one; b Secondary = 
Academic secondary and vocational secondary. 
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The Lack of a Second Chance (Research Question 2) 
Table 8.5 reports the percentage of students in whom one of the listed events 
has ever occurred during their secondary school career. Note that this might 
be an overestimation of the fluidity of the system, because it counts all 
movements irrespective of their direction.8 
Table 8.5 underlines the lack of a second chance in Hungarian public 
education. The events in Rows 7 to 10 (in italics as in the original) depict the 
channels that lead to dropping out of the system, whereas Rows 11 to 13 are 
those that lead back to the system. ‘Tendencies are clear: when the chance of 
dropping out from full-time education is small (4–5 per cent) – as for the 
non-Roma students and for the full population – the chance of returning back 
to the system is also small (14–19 per cent). However, when there is a real 
stake – for the Roma students and especially for Roma students with non-
educated parents who have a high chance of dropping out from full time 
education (28–34 per cent) – the chance of returning to the system is tiny (8–
9 per cent)’ (Kertesi and Kézdi 2010b, 390, own translation).  
Nevertheless, it also seems that the initial allocation of students is not 
entirely permanent: there is non-negligible movement between tracks during 
these four years. For instance 25 per cent of students who were ever enrolled 
in the apprenticeship/vocational training track have also moved to a 
secondary (academic or vocational) track during their school career. However 
whereas the ‘upward’ movements are similar or larger in size for the total 
population, the ‘downward’ movements are much more prevalent for the 
Roma or the low-status population. 
Short- and Long-Term Effects (Research Question 3) 
Using the NABC dataset, both Horn (2013) and Hermann (2013) have 
confirmed differences between the short-term effects of various tracks. Horn 
(2013) has argued that the early-selective academic tracks increase students’ 
10th-grade test scores compared to those of very similar students in other 
tracks. Hermann (2013) has pinpointed that students who apply to vocational 
secondary tracks but are instead accepted only to vocational training tracks 
perform worse in 10th grade than very similar students who are admitted to 
the vocational secondary track. So it seems that early tracking and vocational 
tracking both have harmful short-term effects on educational equalities. 
However, no comparable findings are available on long-term effects. 
Recently Gurzó and Horn (2015) have shown that there are no visible 
effects of early tracking on average labour market outcomes. That is, the 
introduction of early tracking during the post-Communist transition has not 
increased the average probability of employment, the average probability of 
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Table 8.6: Percentage distribution of students in the different tracks six 
years after upper secondary track entry  
9th-grade track 
type 
Working Unem-
ployed 
Study-
trainee 
Other Total % in 
population 
Other 10.99 28.38 44.32 16.32 100 1.7 
Lower sec. 29.41 30.77 29.64 10.18 100 0.4 
Apprenticeship 41.23 24.84 20.25 13.68 100 21 
Vocational sec. 24.16 15.85 51.98 8.01 100 41.4 
Academic sec. 11.26 5.55 77.82 5.37 100 27.1 
Early selective 
academic sec. 
(6 or 8 year) 
8.54 3.05 85.36 3.05 100 8.4 
Total 22.72 14.14 54.92 8.21   
Source: Own calculations based on the HLCS. 
unemployment, or the level of wages. This, however, does not mean that 
early tracking has not had an impact on inequalities: a non-changing level of 
employment or wages might easily mask increasing differences between 
different groups. Employment chances or wages might have increased for one 
and decreased for another group. Their result shows only that early selection 
was not a Pareto optimal policy and suggests that early tracking has a 
heterogeneous effect on different sub-populations. 
Although we are unable to test the long-term causal effect of tracking, the 
HLCS can be used to indicate long-term differences between groups that are 
probably due, at least partially, to sorting. Table 8.6 shows the raw 
differences without controlling for any other predictor in 2012 – six years 
after upper secondary entry and two years after the potential graduation date 
– between students who were in different tracks in 2006. It is relatively hard 
to judge the success of different tracks in terms of an increase in employment 
chances or enrolment to university due to their different student intake as 
well as their different aims. However, it is obvious that students entering the 
early selective academic tracks are more likely to be studying, whereas 
apprenticeship/vocational track graduates are much more likely to be 
unemployed than graduates from vocational secondary. 
Table 8.7 goes one step further and assesses marginal differences between 
tracks ceteris paribus family status and test scores in 8th grade using a 
multinomial probit estimation. As expected, higher status and higher skills 
contribute significantly to further studies. 
Also, as expected, students in academic secondary and early-selective 
tracks are 15 to 17 per cent more likely to study than the similarly skilled and
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Table 8.7: Marginal track differences in outcomes six years after upper 
secondary entry, multinomial probit 
 Work Unemployed Study Other 
SES –0.036** –0.066** 0.135** –0.033** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.005) 
Test score –0.044** –0.065** 0.122** –0.013** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.006) 
Other –0.139** 0.037 0.036 0.066* 
 (0.033) (0.038) (0.056) (0.036) 
Lower secondary 0.027 0.038 –0.064 –0.001 
 (0.082) (0.071) (0.088) (0.042) 
Apprenticeship 0.138** 0.007 –0.172** 0.027** 
 (0.019) (0.015) (0.019) (0.012) 
Secondary  track 
(ref. Vocational) 
    
Academic  –0.090** –0.059** 0.146** 0.003 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.020) (0.012) 
Early-selective –0.091** –0.073** 0.174** –0.010 
 (0.026) (0.029) (0.034) (0.020) 
Observations 7 057 7 057 7 057 7 057 
Source: Own calculations based on the HLCS. 
Notes:  + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Marginal effects for a vocational secondary track student, who has an average socio-
economic status (SES=0) and average test score (Test score = 0). 
similar status vocational secondary graduate. This effect is comparable to the 
effect of a one standard deviation increase in test scores or in status. 
Apprenticeship/vocational training graduates are more likely to work than 
vocational secondary graduates but are less likely to study. There is no 
difference between these tracks in unemployment probabilities. 
All in all it seems that tracks do what is formally/officially expected from 
them: apprenticeship tracks increase employment probabilities, whereas 
academic tracks increase the chance of further studies – at least two years 
after expected graduation. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter has highlighted the main mechanisms that lead to the rather 
large inequality of opportunity (OECD 2010a) of the Hungarian public 
education system. Based on the summarized literature, we have argued that at 
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least five important mechanisms contribute to the level of inequality. 
Competition between primary level schools for high-status students generates 
status-segregated schools within the system (see Kertesi and Kézdi 2009, 
2013). Early tracking on the lower secondary level is also likely to add to this 
segregation (see Horn 2013), whereas vocational tracking on the upper 
secondary level further aggravates differences (Hermann 2013). Besides 
these mechanisms, differences between public and non-public education 
providers (Dronkers and Róbert 2004) as well as within-school separation of 
students are also probable generators of inequalities. 
Whereas the empirical analyses provided in this chapter are certainly not 
causal, we reckon they are indicative of the sheer size of the problem. All of 
these mechanisms differentiate between students based on their family status 
even when we take the initial skills of the students into account. In fact the 
size of the SES effect is at least as large – if not larger – than the size of the 
test scores. This suggests that it is not solely the ability of the students that is 
decisive for school placement but also their social status. 
Using results from other sources, we have also highlighted that although 
the initial track placements are not carved in stone, and there is a significant 
amount of between-track mobility, the lack of a second chance is alarming. 
Students, especially Roma students and students with non-educated parents, 
have a very low chance of returning to the system once they have dropped 
out. 
 
NOTES 
1 Nonetheless a few traditional, church-run schools were allowed to operate even during the 
Communist era. 
2  Parts of this law came into force in September 2012; others, in September 2013. 
3  For some qualitative information and evidence based on small-scale surveys, see Erőss and 
Kende (2008). 
4  Whereas in general, the schools outline the admission criteria for all out-of-district students – 
such as previous performance, siblings already enrolled in the school, or social status – the 
final admission decision is the sole responsibility of the principal. 
5  The variables used to generate the SES index are highest parental education, parent’s labour 
market status, books at home, available personalties at home (TV, washing machine, car, 
mobile telephone), devices to assist in learning at home (computer), and family participation 
in cultural activities (see Hermann and Molnár 2008 in Hungarian)  
6  For more detail on the HLCS in Hungarian, see Kertesi and Kézdi (2010b). 
7  By using school fixed effects, our estimates are based only on observations in which the 
school changed between grades. This is more restrictive between 6th and 8th grade, because 
most students change school between 8th and 10th grade anyway. 
8  For instance, if a student moves from vocational secondary to apprenticeship/vocational 
training and then later moves back, this appears as two events in Table 8.5, whereas in 
another statistic, it would appear as a permanent allocation (cf. start and finish in vocational 
secondary). 
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